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Introduction
The National-led government of Prime Minister Bill English 
recently announced changes to the eligibility rules for receipt 
of New Zealand Superannuation (NZS). In 2037 the age 
from which New Zealand residents become eligible to receive 
NZS will begin to rise – by six months each year – from 
the current age of 65 to reach 67 by July 2040. Residency 
requirements will also rise, to 20 years from ten (five of 
which must be after age 50).1 This is a dramatic change for 
the new PM, who had been part of the previous Cabinet 
under Prime Minister John Key which, since 2008, steadfastly 
refused to consider changing 
the eligibility conditions for 
NZS. Treasury projected that 
without such changes the 
fiscal costs of NZS would rise 
from 4.8% of GDP in 2015 to 
6.3% in 2030, reaching 7.9% 
by 2060 (Treasury, 2016).2
This article addresses two key NZS 
policy-relevant questions. Is it sensible to 
raise the age of eligibility? And is the 
timing – delaying adjustments until 2037-
40 – appropriate? Initial public debate on 
both these questions has focused on two 
aspects. First, is raising the age to 67 
consistent with intergenerational equity? 
Second, by delaying the changes for 
another 20 years, has ‘the horse already 
bolted’? That is, does the future fiscal 
affordability of NZS require more urgent 
change? The next sections address each of 
those issues in turn.Norman Gemmell holds a Chair in Public Finance at Victoria University of Wellington.
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Intergenerational equity
The first problem with assessing impacts 
on intergenerational equity is defining it. 
Sidestepping the issue of what is meant 
by a ‘generation’, in the context of state 
pension provision, intergenerational 
equity is often represented as an equal 
contribution by each generation to 
fiscal balances (taxes paid and pensions 
received).3 This is usually taken to mean 
that currently working taxpayers, funding 
pensions for the previous generation of 
workers, now retired, should be able to 
rely on the same pension benefits when 
they retire, paid for by the next generation 
of working taxpayers.4 This is the basis 
of a so-called PAYGO (pay as you go) 
superannuation system, whereby current 
pensions are paid for out of current tax 
revenues.5 Coleman (2012) produced 
New Zealand estimates of net tax paid to 
fund pensions and the pensions received 
on average since 1976. These indicate that 
New Zealanders have typically paid taxes 
during their working (and retired) lives 
that amount to less than half the value of 
the pensions they receive.6
This may seem unsustainable, but 
need not be. Consider the New Zealand 
case, where the state pension is indexed to 
wages. In any accounting period pension 
expenditure, Ep equals the average pension 
received, p, multiplied by the number of 
pension recipients, Np:
 Ep = pNp (1)
In a PAYGO system the tax revenue 
required to pay for pensions, Tp, is levied 
in the same period and can be described 
by:
 Tp = atwNw (2)
where t is the average tax rate applied to 
wages, w, Nw is the number of taxpayers, 
and a is the fraction of tax revenue used to 
finance pension spending. (For simplicity 
it is assumed here that only workers 
pay tax, and only non-workers receive 
pensions.) Setting (1) equal to (2) gives 
the tax rate required to finance pensions:
 t = (1/a)(pNp/wNw) (3)
Equation (3) can be thought of as 
applying to different cohorts or 
generations, illustrating the components 
contributing to intergenerational equity. 
In particular, intergenerational equity 
might reasonably be taken to imply that 
the tax rate, t, should be constant across 
generations. Similarly, the fraction of tax 
revenue used to finance pensions (and 
hence unavailable for other public 
spending), a, should remain constant. 
This leaves the term (pNp/wNw) on the 
right-hand side of (3) and raises the 
question of whether intergenerational 
equity requires that p/w is constant across 
generations – a constant average pension 
relative to the average wage – or requires 
that the ratio of total pension spending to 
total wages, pNp/wNw, is constant across 
generations, or both.
If there is no population ageing, then 
Np/Nw is constant and the question is 
irrelevant. But with population ageing, 
Np/Nw will increase over succeeding 
generations such that p/w would need to 
fall to keep pNp/wNw constant.7 Thus, 
should intergenerational equity require 
that each individual in each generation is 
treated equally or that each generation as 
a whole is treated equally? The former 
view (p/w constant) inevitably implies 
less private spending in the later, more 
aged generation, and/or less tax to spend 
on other public transfers or services. But 
this also seems inconsistent with 
intergenerational equity.
A longer version of this article, 
Gemmell (2017), illustrates these impacts 
of ageing using an overlapping generations 
simulation for a simplified case where a 
new (equal-sized) generation, i, is born 
every 30 years, and each individual works 
for 40 years, retires at age 65, then lives for 
a further 20 years. All individuals earn 
wages and pay tax at a constant tax rate 
while working, then receive a pension but 
pay no tax when retired. The pension 
level, p, is set at a fraction of the current 
average wage, w. Based on setting the p/w 
= 0.25 for each i = 1 – 4, the model yields 
values for total pensions (Pi) and tax 
revenues (Ti). Table 1 shows the resulting 
ratios of generation i’s pensions to their 
own tax payments, and to the tax 
payments of the next generation (Pi/Ti 
and Pi/Ti+1).
The table shows three scenarios: no 
ageing; ageing in the form of two years’ 
longer retirement for each successive 
generation; and a ‘reform’ case where 
pension receipt for generations 2–4 is 
delayed by one, two and three years 
respectively. When there is no ageing both 
ratios remain constant across generations. 
However, with ageing (longer retirement), 
both ratios increase across generations 
and are inconsistent with intergenerational 
equity: later generations have to commit a 
higher fraction of their incomes to 
support the previous generation. The 
‘reform’ case, however, moves the two 
ratios substantially towards the no-ageing 
case of Pi/Ti+1 = 0.46 and Pi/Ti = 1.5, 
suggesting that suitable ‘tweaking’ of 
retirement ages in response to increased 
longevity can deal with those fiscal 
dimensions of intergenerational equity.
Finally, the above analysis assumes 
that policy continues to link future 
pensions to future wages. If this policy 
was to alter, for example by instead 
indexing pensions to price inflation, then, 
as equation (3) makes clear, there is 
greater potential for increased 
intergenerational inequity as p/w falls 
over time.
Table 1: Ageing, pensions and intergenerational equity
  Pi/Ti+1  Pi/Ti 
Ageing: generation None Longer retirement Reform None Longer retirement Reform
1 0.46 0.46 0.46 1.50 1.50 1.50
2 0.46 0.53 0.47 1.50 1.73 1.60
3 0.46 0.61 0.50 1.50 1.97 1.70
4 – – – 1.50 2.24 1.80
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Non-fiscal intergenerational equity 
dimensions
Some recent arguments suggesting 
intergenerational inequities in current 
superannuation arrangements or 
the proposed reforms relate to other 
intergenerational equity dimensions. 
These include concern that baby boomers 
(born approximately between the mid-
1940s and mid-1960s) have benefited 
from a particular generational advantage. 
They are a historically large cohort – due 
to the post-war ‘baby boom’ – which can 
afford to retire at or before age 65, and 
with expectations of a longer retirement 
period than previous generations. The 
allegation is typically that this advantage 
is at the expense of a larger burden on the 
current/next generation of wage earners 
to fund baby boomer pensions.
But this ignores two other important 
intergenerational equity dimensions. 
First, there are non-fiscal generational 
transfers from baby boomers to later gen-
erations. Second, most of the fiscal-related 
intergenerational equity phenomenon has 
little to do specifically with the baby 
boomer generation. Each of these argu-
ment is examined in turn below.
Transfers from baby boomers
The phrase ‘standing on the shoulders 
of giants’, used by Isaac Newton in 1676 
to describe his scientific advances, also 
captures the externalities that each 
succeeding generation benefit from due 
to the advances (scientific, economic, 
social etc.) made by previous generations. 
Few would deny, for example, that the 
considerable sacrifices of the suffragette 
movement in the 19th century brought 
many and substantial benefits to later 
generations of women – and society more 
broadly – that far exceeded the benefits 
they themselves enjoyed from their efforts.
Likewise, the post-World War II 
decades witnessed increases in per capita 
incomes in New Zealand such that average 
real income in 2013 was around 2.5 times 
average real income in 1950.8 Reliably 
identifying the sources of this income 
growth is a complex exercise, but it 
undoubtedly arose in part in response to 
the entrepreneurial activity, innovation 
and investment by the post-1950 
generation.
Much of this would involve sacrifices 
of current consumption to generate 
higher future incomes which both reward 
the investing generation and provide a 
higher platform of living standards (the 
giant’s ‘shoulders’) that later generations 
can enjoy and from which they can launch 
further income growth. The baby boomer 
generation has therefore in some sense 
‘bequeathed’ an externality of higher 
living standards on future generations, 
and from which their state retirement 
incomes are funded.
A baby boomer-specific problem?
Despite much popular rhetoric, the 
intergenerational ‘fiscal transfer’ due to 
population ageing is associated only to 
a limited extent with the baby boomer 
phenomenon. This is illustrated by Figure 
1, from Treasury (2013a). This shows 
two forms of age dependency ratio: the 
population aged 65+, and the population 
under 15 years, both as ratios of the 
population aged 15–64 years. The figure 
covers the period from 1940, with future 
years based on Statistics New Zealand’s 
median demographic projections to 2060.
Two profiles are shown for each 
dependency ratio, based on (1) actual data 
(‘w boom’); and (2) a hypothetical ‘what 
if ’ scenario assuming no baby boom in 
post-war birth rates (‘no boom’). It is 
clear from Figure 1 that, although there 
was a substantial boost to the under-15 
age group in the mid-40s to mid-60s 
period, the impact of this 40–50 years 
later on the 65+ dependency ratio is 
relatively small.
The increasing upward trend in the 
65+ ratio from around 2010 is not 
substantially due to the earlier baby boom. 
Rather, it is due to the various medical 
and other advances, especially in the post-
war period, which raised the survival rates 
of children and the longevity of the 
elderly. Combined with a steady decline in 
fertility rates over this period, the outcome 
is a sharp rise in the 65+ age ratio which is 
first evident from the 1970s and is 
expected to continue for at least several 
decades into the future.
Debate over retirement income policy 
reform could, therefore, usefully focus 
more on how to deal fairly with a general 
and persistent ageing phenomenon 
(which, of course, brings many benefits to 
future generations), and less on whether 
baby boomers have gained some form of 
unfair generational advantage.
Educational (dis)advantages?
A commonly heard intergenerational 
equity argument regarding an especially 
favoured baby boomer generation relates to 
their state-funded education, particularly at 
the tertiary level. Whereas the costs of baby 
boomer tertiary education were generally 
heavily subsidised by the state, this is much 
less true for recent cohorts of tertiary 
students who have to privately fund a larger 
fraction of their tertiary education. With 
expectations of delayed retirement (via an 
increased age of eligibility for NZS), it can 
seem that current and future generations 
of young people are being fiscally squeezed 
at both ends of the life cycle, compared 
especially to baby boomers.
Figure 1: Baby Boom Effects on Dependency Ratios
Source: NZ Treasury (2013a, p.18)
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There is some merit to this argument. 
The growth in public spending in the 
post-World War II period was associated 
with unsustainably rising public debt, 
especially from the 1970s. It provided a 
sizeable subsidy to those 18–25-year-olds 
who entered tertiary education, but was 
progressively withdrawn from later 
cohorts when governments began to 
recognise the need for greater fiscal 
restraint in the 1980s.
However, before concluding that this 
post-1980s restraint represents an inter-
generational inequity, it is worth noting 
two pertinent aspects. First, the fraction 
of the student-age cohort entering tertiary 
education has been steadily rising over the 
20th century. As a result, the total subsidy 
for earlier cohorts of students may be 
much less than that for recent and current 
cohorts. For example, data on university 
enrolment and population by age group 
shows that the ratio of enrolled students 
to all 15–24-year-olds rose from 4.2% in 
1951 to 28.5% in 2013, and trebled from 
1971 when most baby boomers were in 
the relevant age group.9 So, even if per 
capita real state subsidies to tertiary 
education are more limited for recent 
student cohorts, the total real tertiary 
subsidy seems likely to be greater. In 
addition, with greater numbers entering 
tertiary education recently, working life 
begins later, on average, for those cohorts.
Finally, it was argued earlier that, like 
generations before them, the baby boomer 
generation ‘bequeaths’ a positive external-
ity on future generations in the form of 
higher living standards. However, it could 
be argued that concerns about 
intergenerational equity should not 
simply focus on whether a given 
generation is treated fairly relative to 
future generations, but also with respect 
to past generations. By its nature economic 
growth necessarily treats early (relative to 
late) generations ‘unfairly’ by virtue of the 
lower living standards the former 
experience. Since this ‘inequity’ cannot be 
corrected ex post, it begs the question 
whether, with growing incomes, policy 
should aim to favour each current 
generation to some degree by utilising 
resources that would otherwise accrue to 
future generations. Of course, difficulties 
identifying how much favouring is 
appropriate and how inevitable 
uncertainties surrounding future 
generations’ economic conditions should 
be treated render these intergenerational 
equity judgements extremely difficult in 
practice.
Has the horse already bolted?
Even if, in principle, raising the age of 
eligibility for NZS represents a move 
towards greater intergenerational equity, 
is the proposal to delay it to 2037–40 
sensible?
As is well known, Prime Minister Key 
refused to consider increasing the NZS 
age when seeking election in 2008 despite 
Treasury showing that there was a strong 
case for considering it (Treasury, 2006). 
Labour finance minister at the time 
Michael Cullen was also rumoured to 
have dismissed the 2006 report as ‘alarmist 
tendentious nonsense’. As Figure 1 shows, 
the especially rapid increase in the over 
65s occurs around 2010–40. But changes 
to any pension arrangement require a 
reasonable lead time to give those 
approaching retirement opportunity to 
adapt to reduced future incomes. The best 
time to act – or at least to consider it 
seriously – was therefore well before 2010 
so that suitable funding arrangements 
could be put in place and the relevant 
trade-offs addressed.
This was indeed the driving force 
behind the ‘Cullen Fund’ set up in 2001, to 
pre-fund the expected increase in NZS 
due to ageing, although substantial 
payments out of the fund are not expected 
until the 2050s at the earliest. So, there is 
an argument that the age of eligibility for 
NZS should have been raised some time 
ago to make it more fiscally affordable and 
to improve intergenerational equity. At 
least notification some time ago of an 
increase around 2020 would have made 
sense, enabling eligibility changes to better 
match the post-2010 boost in NZS 
spending. But, having delayed the decision 
to 2017, the proposed 20-year lead time 
before implementation represents a 
compromise between tackling the 
imminent fiscal ‘problem’ while giving 
those currently aged in their 40s and 50s 
enough time to prepare for delayed NZS 
receipt.
Gemmell (2017) compares the 
proposed lead times between announce-
ment and implementation for NZS 
changes with similar reforms in various 
OECD countries. This suggests that the 
New Zealand government has selected 
one of the longer lead times for its NZS 
eligibility increase. Given the imminent 
sharp increase in the 65+ population 
noted above, arguably a shorter period 
before implementation could have been 
justified.
In summary, the ‘NZS ageing’ horse 
hasn’t bolted. Persistent population ageing 
will require continued scrutiny (and 
probably upward adjustment) of the age 
of NZS receipt. But, by delaying a decision 
to 2017, with implementation from 2037, 
recent New Zealand governments have 
bequeathed to future governments an 
imminent, rapidly growing fiscal 
commitment for NZS payments. This will 
undoubtedly lead to more difficult trade-
... by delaying a [eligibility rules for 
receipt of New Zealand Superannuation] 
decision to 2017, with implementation 
from 2037, recent New Zealand 
governments have bequeathed to future 
governments an imminent, rapidly 
growing fiscal commitment for NZS 
payments. 
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offs over the next 10–20 years over how far 
taxes should rise to pay for this increased 
fiscal burden, and how far to compromise 
on other public spending objectives 
potentially impacting disproportionately 
on those under age 67. However, both 
retired and working individuals over this 
period will be likely to face the 
consequences of those choices. Inevitably 
there is no single ‘best choice’ here. 
Decisions of whether and when to raise 
the age of NZS eligibility involve several 
interpersonal and intergenerational trade-
offs where preferences and value 
judgements legitimately vary across 
individuals.
1 Details of the changes and the case for change are set out in 
New Zealand Government (2017).
2 A cut of around 1% of GDP by 2060 is projected if the age 
of eligibility for NZS is increased to age 67 in the 2020s.
3 There are, of course, much wider definitions of 
intergenerational equity beyond fiscal dimensions. For 
example, environmental debates often focus on the 
intergenerational impacts on natural capital stocks: see 
Gemmell (2017) for more details.
4 How ‘the same pension’ is defined is often unclear in 
intergenerational equity debates. It could be defined as 
constant in real dollar terms, relative to the wages earned by 
retirees when they were working, or relative to the wages of 
the current workers paying the wages of current retirees.
5 The alternative is a SAYGO (save as you go) system, where 
each cohort of workers pays for its own future pensions 
through age-related savings schemes, usually involving some 
tax-favoured status. See Creedy and Van De Ven (2000). 
The New Zealand system is essentially PAYGO with a small 
recent SAYGO element through KiwiSaver.
6 Coleman’s ‘pension-financing taxes’ are based on assuming 
that all the value of pensions paid in a given year are 
effectively entirely tax-funded, i.e. ignoring the allocation of 
any public deficit-financed expenditures.
7 Note that if the population ages purely via people living 
longer, this can be represented as a population increase for 
the additional years in which the relevant individuals now 
remain alive: see below.
8 See https:data1850.nz.
9 Census age groups are 15–19 and 20–24: see Gemmell 
(2017).
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